Does Small Business Administration guaranteed lending improve economic performance in low–income areas? (commentary) by Alicia Robb
To give a brief overview of the paper that was presented, I want to focus
on the big picture idea: Credit markets are imperfect, especially in the small
business lending market. The authors propose that two Small Business
Administration (SBA) programs may produce a more socially optional
outcome—a better allocation of credit, which then promotes economic
development. Their empirical work focuses on Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA) and county-level data on these SBA programs and their effect on per
capita income growth. It is a great idea for research.
My comments are going to follow the structure of their paper: first some
thoughts on the big picture and then some thoughts on the empirical find-
ings. The theme of my comments is “What I’d like to see in the future.”
For credit market failures, I would like to see to see some discussion of
SBA lending in context. Some data on where small businesses get their
financing would be useful. The reader is left not knowing how big the
market is. The SBA guaranteed $7.4 billion in loans in 2001, but, in that
same year, small business bank lending was about $460 billion. The 1998
Survey of Small Business Finances shows that more than half of the financial
capital of small businesses was held in debt. This was especially true for
young firms, which held nearly 70 percent of their financial capital in debt.
On average, commercial banks held 39 percent of the total debt of all small
businesses in 1998. Overall, trade credit accounted for about one-third of the
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87debt held. Other sources for debt, such as government, family, friends, and
other businesses, held relatively small amounts of all small business debt.
What is the optimal level of an SBA guarantee? The authors suggest it’s
greater than zero, but it would be interesting to look at the most optimal
level. What does the guarantee do to interest rates? Does it lower them by 50
or 100 basis points? It would be interesting to investigate. Is there any
evidence that there is an impact on default rates? Is there any research on
default rates for SBA-backed loans? Such a comparison would be interesting.
As for what I’d like to see empirically, I first wrote out the main equation
from the authors’ paper. I would like to address my comments by talking
about each of the variables in the model. Their model is:
Per capita income growth=
Employment rate




SBA loans per capita
Interactions
Per capita income growth. First, why should this variable be used? Most
people aren’t affected directly by SBA loans, so why not look at employ-
ment growth or business formations as the dependent variable of interest?
SBA loans on average were about $26 each year per capita, so we are
talking about a small amount. It will be hard to find any effect from some-
thing this small on something such as changes in per capital income growth.
Shouldn’t there be some kind of demographic adjustment? Think about
a county in Florida with a huge percentage of retirees. The retirees typically
have lower levels of personal income on average, and they live by drawing
down on their wealth. Think of a county with a huge percentage of young
people not even in the labor market. They don’t have personal income.
Demographic changes will affect changes in personal income, so shouldn’t
we adjust for these differences across counties and MSAs?
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 The mean of the dependent variable seems improbable. How can you
have a negative mean of 3.6 percent annually when the national average is
positive 4.4 percent over that period? It might be driven by treating every
county the same, in other words, New York City and rural Kansas. But,
even so, that average is highly suspect.
Employment rate. If we are looking to capture labor market conditions,
wouldn’t changes of per capita income be driven by changes in the employ-
ment rate? Another issue is that the right-hand-side variable is affected by
only those in the labor force, while the left-hand side is everyone.
Herfindahl index. Is this index a proxy for credit availability or competi-
tion? The fact that the maximum value of the Herfindahl index is one
means there are some rural areas with one bank that are being counted
equally with urban MSAs. The initial version of the paper had indicated a
positive effect of the Herfindahl index, which is not what we would expect
from what theory tells us. It since has changed to negative, but there is no
explanation as to the role of this variable. At least a minimal explanation is
needed in the paper.
Per capita income. The biggest question here is, Why do we expect the
level to affect change? I would like to see a better explanation about that.
Levels affecting changes is a central theme in endogenous growth theory,
but I’m not sure I understand it in this context.
Deposits per capita. I am confused as to the interpretation of this variable.
The authors state that it is their “measure of financial development, and a
proxy for local market income level.” How is this a measure of financial devel-
opment? It could, in fact, be the opposite. Deposit accounts are old-fashioned
technology. Maybe this variable is a measure of financial development and/or
a proxy for local market income in comparing Kenya and Canada, but not
necessarily in comparing New York City to a rural county in Kansas. The
authors also state that “deposits should be highly correlated with lending,” but
deposits could just be correlated with wealth. And there is a question of stocks
versus flows here.
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 SBA loans per capita. The sample mean is $32.87, which is a pretty small
number, especially relative to per capita income of $37,000. What about loans
to small businesses? One could look at County Business Patterns for small
business numbers. This is not a perfect source, but it is probably suitable.
So, why did the authors find what they found? What’s the natural experi-
ment here? Are areas that receive above-average amounts of SBA loans simply
areas where economies are expanding? In other words, is the SBA variable
simply a proxy for the economic growth of an area, independent of SBA’s
programs? Are there any policies within the SBA programs that would create
a quasi-natural experiment to be exploited for identification, for instance,
Congressional districts of small bank committee members? There may, in
fact, be no such relationship, but something is needed. 
I’m not convinced by the causation argument in this model. There is no
model of what is driving the quantity of SBA loans. What you want ideally
is the SBA to just not back any loans in a few counties and see if it
matters—there needs to be some sort of natural experiment. We need an
explanation for the source of variation of SBA loans across a county/MSA.
Right now, that’s treated as exogenous, but it’s probably not.
The regressions are sparsely documented. There really isn’t enough
information to evaluate the panel regressions in the paper. I would suggest
increased documentation.
I would like to end by saying this is an important area of research and the
initial results are interesting, but I’d like to see further empirical work. I
would like to see more regressions and more detailed explanations. Some
graphs would be of interest. The authors might consider, perhaps, weight-
ing the regressions so that large MSAs count more in the analysis. Grouping
close MSAs to the consolidated MSA level, for example, the Bay Area,
might make sense. There are many potential side questions that I’ve
mentioned that also could be addressed.
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